

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-11 L-03 ACDA-19 NSAE-00 PA-04

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6828

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4266

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 4000

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, XG

SUBJECT: CSCE: JULY 19 NAC DISCUSSION

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

REF: STATE 156180

BEGIN SUMMARY: IN JULY 19 NAC DISCUSSION OF CSCE, ALLIES
RENEWED OBJECTIONS TO MOVING TOO RAPIDLY TOWARD DEVELOPMENT AND
EARLY PRESENTATION TO THE EAST OF AN ALLIANCE POSITION ON
ESSENTIAL CENTRAL REQUIREMENTS IN BASKET III. MAJORITY OF
ALLIES FELT THE WESTERN POSITION SHOULD BE MADE KNOWN TO
SOVIETS AND EES ONLY AFTER FULL READING IS GIVEN TO THE
HELSINKI BASKET III MANDATE IN GENEVA. UK MADE HELPFUL
SUGGESTION, HOWEVER, THAT FUTURE WORK IN THE ALLIANCE
ADDRESS NEGOTIATING TACTICS WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE GIVING THE
EAST AN EARLY IDEA OF WESTERN DESIDERATA.
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ON CMBS, ALLIES SHOWED GENERAL SYMPATHY WITH US
COMPROMISE SUGGESTED FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF
MANEUVERS ALTHOUGH DIFFERENCES REMAIN ON SUBJECT OF A CBM
COVERING MILITARY MOVEMENTS.

COUNCIL DECIDED THAT NATO DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA SHOULD ATTEMPT A PRE RECESS STOCKTAKING OF THE WESTERN POSITION AND CSCE PROSPECTS ON THE BASIS OF THE US (MADRID 4339) AND EC-9PAPERS (USNATO 3900). ALLIES ALSO AGREED THAT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF NATO POSITION ON CBMS SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY POLADS.

QUESTION OF NAC ROLE IN STUDY EFFORT WAS LEFT ON BASIS THAT ANY ALLY COULD CALL FOR COUNCIL SESSION WHENEVER IT CONSIDERED FURTHER ASSESSMENT WOULD BE USEFUL.

CONSIDERABLE RELUCTANCE ON THE PART OF THE ALLIES TO BOTH DEVELOPING SPECIFICS NOW OF FINAL STAGE II AGREEMENTS AS WELL AS TO EARLY PRESENTATION OF ALLIED REQUIREMENT THAT THE EAST WILL REQUIRE CLEAR US LEAD IF US GOALS ARE TO BE ADVANCED IN FURTHER WORK IN GENEVA. END SUMMARY.

1. BELGIUM (REPRESENTED BY CSCE DELEGATION CHIEF HERPIN) OPENED NAC DEBATE ON CSCE ON JULY 19 WITH REHEARSAL OF ISSUES SEPARATING THE EC AND US POSITIONS. FULLY SUPPORTING THE EC POSITION ON SUCH ISSUES, HERPIN RECITED DANGERS OF GIVING SOVIETS A LIST OF ALLIED DESIDERATA NOW SINCE WESTERN MINIMUMS WOULD SOON BECOME MAXIMUM EASTERN POSITION. HELSINKI MANDATE ON BASKET III, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE PLAYED OUT FULLY IN GENEVA "EVEN IF THIS TAKES SEVERAL MORE MONTHS". THE SOVIETS ALREADY KNOW WESTERN REQUIREMENTS IN BASKET III FROM THE HELSINKI MPT. WHAT THEY DON'T KNOW, SAID HERPIN, IS WHETHER THE WEST WOULD HAVE THE COURAGE TO BREAK OFF CSCE IF THESE RESULTS WERE NOT ACHIEVED. HERPIN THOUGHT NATO SHOULD UNDERTAKE AN IN DEPTH STUDY OF CBMS TO DEVELOP A COMMON ATTITUDE AMONG THE FIFTEEN. SIMILARLY, ALLIES SHOULD STUDY QUESTION OF FOLLOW UP.

2. MENZIES (CANADA) WHILE APPRECIATING THE US INITIATIVE ALSO WELCOMED THE EC PAPER WHICH CANADA FOUND "MORE TO ITS CONFIDENTIAL

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LIKING". CANADA THEREFORE PREFERRED TO CONTINUE TESTING THE SOVIETS FOR POSSIBLE CONCESSIONS IN THE HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION FIELD. CANADA REALIZED THIS TESTING MIGHT TAKE TIME AND BELIEVED IT WOULD NOT BEAR FRUIT IF ALLIED DESIDERATA WERE MADE KNOWN IN ADVANCE TO EASTERN DELEGATIONS. "IF ANYONE BELIEVES STATEMENTS CAN BE BROKEN BY GIVING OUR GOALS TO THE EAST IN ADVANCE," SAID MENZIES, "HE IS MISTAKEN." CANADA ALSO THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL THAT ALLIED NEGOTIATORS FIRMLY REJECT SOVIET CONTENTION THAT BASKET III CONCESSIONS WOULD DAMAGE STABILITY IN SMALLER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES SINCE THESE ASSUMPTIONS SMACK OF A SOVIET "COLONIAL" ATTITUDE TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE. MOREOVER, CANADA BELIEVED NO DECISION ON STAGE III SHOULD BE TAKEN UNTIL RESULTS WERE REACHED IN STAGE II. ON CBM'S MENZIES SAID THE U.S. PAPER WENT A LONG

WAY TOWARD IDENTIFYING AN ULTIMATELY ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE ON MANEUVERS. THIS COMPROMISE SHOULD NOT BE SPELLED OUT FOR THE SOVIETS NOW, HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO PROTECT WESTERN NEGOTIATION FLEXIBILITY. ON SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. COMPROMISE SUGGESTION, CANADA FAVORED ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS BY 18,000 MEN OR MORE, RATHER THAN THE U.S. PREFERRED 20,000 SINCE THIS ACCORDED WITH NEUTRAL VIEWS AND WOULD THEREBY INCREASE SUPPORT FOR THE WESTERN POSITION. SIMILARLY, CANADA BELIEVED THAT THE "BROAD BAND" SUGGESTED BY THE U.S. AS THE AREA REQUIRING ADVANCE NOTIFICATION SHOULD BE NO SMALLER THAN 500 KILOMETERS.

3. RUMSFELD FOLLOWED MENZIES' STATEMENT AND DREW FULLY ON THE GUIDANCE IN STATE 156180.

4. SVART (DENMARK) APPRECIATED U.S. EFFORTS TO STIMULATE THINKING ON WESTERN GOALS IN CSCE BUT POINTED TO PROBLEMS OF GIVING THE SOVIETS WHAT THEY WANT IN CSCE WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING CONCESSIONS THAT ARE FUNDAMENTAL TO THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF DETENTE. THERE WERE DANGERS, THEREFORE, IN GIVING PRECISE FORMULATIONS TO THE EAST NOW, OR IN DOING SO BEFORE A COMPLETE READING IN GENEVA OF ALL BASKET III ELEMENTS. THE ALLIES SHOULD FIND IT USEFUL, HOWEVER, TO UNDERTAKE A STUDY THAT WOULD RETAIN ALLIED SOLIDARITY ON SPECIFIC ISSUES AND WHICH WOULD PROVIDE CRITERIA FOR JUDGING THE EVENTUAL STAGE II OUTCOME. SVART THOUGHT THE STUDY SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN GENEVA WITH THE COUNCIL LIMITING ITSELF TO THE FORMULATION OF GENERAL CONFIDENTIAL

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GUIDELINES.

5. UK CHARGE (LOGAN) WELCOMED SECRETARY KISSINGER'S PROPOSALS THAT NATO TAKE STOCK OF CSCE AND AGREED THAT THE FIRST PHASE IN SUCH EFFORT SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN GENEVA. THE UK BELIEVED THAT EXPERTS IN GENEVA COULD WORK RAPIDLY ON THE BASIS OF EC-9 AND U.S. PAPERS IF THE TASK WERE NOT MADE TOO DIFFICULT BY ASKING THEM TO DEFINE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE BEFORE ALL ELEMENTS OF THE HELSINKI MANDATE WERE REVIEWED. MOREOVER, IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE ALLIES IN GENEVA AND IN SUBSEQUENT REVIEW OF THE COUNCIL TO CONCENTRATE ON NEGOTIATING PRIORITIES ON THE SUBSTANCE OF ALLIED POSITIONS AND ON HOW THOSE POSITIONS SHOULD BE CONVEYED TO THE SOVIETS. THE UK DID NOT RULE OUT INFORMING THE SOVIETS OF THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF ALLIED THINKING BUT RECOGNIZED THE RISKS IN GETTING TOO SPECIFIC TOO SOON. SOME VIEW OF GENERAL WESTERN PRIORITIES MIGHT PROVE NECESSARY, HOWEVER, TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

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AMEMBASSY ANKARA

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USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 4000

6. TULEMEN (TURKISH CHARGE) NOTED THAT TURKEY GENERALLY AGREED WITH U.S. VIEWS ON A MANEUVERS COMPROMISE. TURKEY MIGHT FEEL IT NECESSARY, HOWEVER, TO SEEK AN EXCEPTION TO MEET ITS PARTICULAR REQUIREMENTS AS A COUNTRY WITH LONG, COMMON FRONTIERS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND WITH CERTAIN NON-EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES. TURKEY MIGHT, THEREFORE, BE WILLING TO CONCEDE AN EXCEPTION TO THE SOVIETS IF THIS PROVED NECESSARY TO MEET TURKISH REQUIREMENTS (SEE USNATO 3848). GREEK PERMREP (CHORAFAS) REBUTTED THAT ANY EXCEPTIONS MIGHT WEAKEN THE ALLIED POSITION ON CBM'S.

7. IN AGREEING "WORD-FOR-WORD" WITH THE BELGIAN AND CANADIAN VIEWS, NETHERLANDS CHARGE BUWALDA POINTED TO INDICATIONS FROM GENEVA OF SOVIET "EUPHORIA" OVER THE FACT THAT THE ALLIES WERE DEVELOPING A LIST OF MINIMUM CSCE REQUIREMENTS. BUWALDA SAID SUCH A LIST HAD ALREADY BEEN DEVELOPED IN COUNCIL DOCUMENT CM72(24) WHICH LISTED ALLIED DESIDERATA IN THE HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION AREA BEFORE THE HELSINKI MPT. BUWALDA AGREED THAT CONFIDENTIAL

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DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA MIGHT STUDY THE U.S. AND EC PAPERS TO PERMIT SUBSEQUENT REVIEW IN BRUSSELS BUT PRIORITIES SHOULD NOT BE CHOSEN NOW AND NOTHING SHOULD BE GIVEN SOON TO THE EAST.

8. DE ROSE (FRANCE) ECHOED THE CAUTIONARY NOTE STRUCK BY BELGIUM, CANADA AND OTHERS ON THE DANGERS OF IDENTIFYING SPECIFIC WESTERN REQUIREMENTS OR OF EARLY REVELATION OF THESE TO THE SOVIETS. DE ROSE THOUGHT IT BETTER TO APPROACH THE SOVIETS ON A BROADER FRONT EMCOMPASSING ALL BASKET III ISSUES AS A FIRST STEP SINCE HE HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE THE SOVIETS

WOULD BE MORE FLEXIBLE IN SEPTEMBER.

9. IN PRAISING BOTH THE U.S. AND EC CONTRIBUTIONS, CATALANO (ITALY) SAW THE DANGERS IN DELAY IDENTIFIED BY THE U.S. AS WELL AS THE DANGERS OF HASTE FEARED BY THE NINE. HE SUGGESTED, THEREFORE, THAT THE COUNCIL KEEP THESE PROBLEMS CONTINUALLY UNDER REVIEW AS DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA ATTEMPT TO FURTHER REFINE THE WESTERN POSITION.

10. IN SUMMING UP, ACTING SYG (COUNCIL DEAN DE STAERCKE) NOTED AGREEMENT THAT FUTURE WORK ON CBMS BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE NATO POLITICAL COMMITTEE. WITH REGARD TO OTHER POINTS RAISED IN THE U.S. AND EC PAPERS, DE STAERCKE SUGGESTED THAT THESE BE ADDRESSED FIRST BY DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA WHO COULD DRAW ON CONTACTS WITH NON-NATO DELEGATIONS IN GETTING A SENSE OF GENERAL DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK. DE STAERCKE NOTED THE NINE'S RELUCTANCE TO SET SPECIFIC AND PRIORITIES BEFORE A COMPLETE FIRST READING OF BASKET III ELEMENTS IN GENEVA. THIS CONFLICTED WITH THE U.S. PROJECTION OF TIMING FOR FUTURE WORK IN GENEVA AND BRUSSELS. DE STAERCKE THEREFORE ASKED RUMSFELD IF THE U.S. COULD AGREE WITH A DELAY OF PERHAPS MORE THAN ONE MONTH SO THAT CONCLUSIONS COULD BE DRAWN AFTER A POST-RECESS, FIRST READING OF BASKET III. RUMSFELD SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO REPORT DE STAERCKE'S PERSONAL VIEWS BUT OBVIOUSLY COULD NOT AGREE TO DELAYS IN ADDRESSING MATTERS WHICH THE U.S. CONSIDERED URGENT. HE NOTED THE DANGERS CITED BY SEVERAL DELEGATIONS IN MOVING TOO RAPIDLY WITH FUTURE WORK, BUT SAID THERE WERE GREATER DANGERS ON THE OTHER SIDE AND THE ALLIES MUST BEGIN NOW TO WEIGH THESE MATTERS. IN THIS CONTEXT, RUMSFELD NOTED THAT, JUST AS IN THE COUNCIL, THE GENEVA DELEGATIONS RESPOND TO THEIR CAPITALS AND INSTRUCTIONS FROM INDIVIDUAL
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GOVERNMENTS WILL THEREFORE GO TO GENEVA AS DELEGATIONS THERE ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE ALLIED POSITIONS.

11. THE COUNCIL AGREED THAT GENEVA DELEGATIONS SHOULD UNDERTAKE NOW A REVIEW BOTH OF THE U.S. AND EC PAPERS WITH A VIEW TO NARROWING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM. THE RESULTS OF THIS REVIEW MIGHT BE AVAILABLE BEFORE THE RECESS. PARALLEL WORK ON CBMS SHOULD GO FORWARD IN THE NATO POLITICAL COMMITTEE.
RUMSFELD

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